Revisiting Timor Leste Crisis in 2006: Lessons in Peacebuilding

Ten years after its independence through referendum, Timor Leste is very much like a baby learning to walk on governance and politics arena. Just like a baby, it is susceptible and prone to viruses, missteps and diseases. There is an atmosphere of fragility and volatility of its health condition.

True enough in 2006, Timor Leste experienced a political and social crisis. The immediate cause reported was the dismissal of more than 600 troops in the government's military forces when they deserted their posts and refused to go back to barracks. The desertion of the disgruntled soldiers was sparked by the alleged preferential in the military structure of the Lorosae (easterners) over the Loromuno (westerners). The discrimination was based on the role and contribution in the resistance and revolutionary movement during the Indonesian occupation. The Lorosae significantly played more prominent roles in the revolutionary front than the Loromuno. The socially geographical divide, distinction and identity between the west and east, struggle for fairness and equality of treatment, and share of power in the military structure pushed the soldiers to defy orders, and it cost them their job and the fragile and volatile political situation of their young country.

However, the International Crisis Group believed that the root cause of the crisis could be traced back historically to the earlier days of the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor (FRETILIN) between its central committee and Xanana Gusmao, then commander of a guerilla army, FALINTIL. The Group also attributed the crisis to the "poorly implemented demobilization of FALINTIL fighters in 2000 and the creation of defence force" which took some fighters in and left some out, unemployed. Thus when the more than 600 soldiers and police took the streets of Dili, they were with unemployed men and gang members.

Acting as the parent of the young country, the UN created various missions to East Timor since 1999. These mission were UNAMET for the preparation, registration and conduct of referendum in 1999, UNTAET for the administration in the transition period in 1999-2002, UNMISET for building and strengthening structures and institutions toward a functional state in 2002-2005, and then during the crisis, UNOTIL for the political mission to support the development of the institutions in 2005-2006. Under the UN mission in 2001, the decision to have a defence force seemed logical since the external threat posed by TNI (Indonesian army) in the neighboring West Timor was ever-present and imposing. Hypothetically at least, a sizeable force could delay any plan of or actual forced occupation or intrusion by the TNI while the international community is pondering whether to intervene militarily or not to stop the TNI. In the anxious minds of Timorese people and historically speaking, this could be a real scenario and they would not want to be caught flat-footed and unprepared. Besides, the defence force would create jobs for the heroes of the revolutionary front. It was a way of acknowledging their efforts and sacrifices coming to fruition. Understandably, the UN was not against job creation and giving due to the heroes of the young country.

However, the presence of TNI in the borders of Timor Leste was misinterpreted as a threat by an insecure young country like East Timor. I think the TNI was there on the borders to secure itself from mass movement of impoverished Timorese people.

Experiences in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in other post-conflict countries would help forecast and prevent similar crisis. Some examples would be in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Congo, just to name a few. I think the mindset of the conflict or war still lingered in the Timorese soldiers at that time. They thought, as long as the TNI were there as a threat within striking distance, the desire to defend the homeland against the others (TNI) ringed vigorously in the hearts and minds of a capable realist, a true revolutionary. They forgot to consider that the revolution was over and that the UN would not allow a repeat of 1975. Anyway, who would argue and go against a strong-willed decision to have a defence force?

Acting as a parent, the UN could only hope for the best to and support its one of the youngest members. And the worst happened but the UN did not abandon its baby. Its neighbors in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also extended their hands for the efforts to make baby steps in the often violent democratization process.